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Kotoba engineering notes

Evidence before slogans

Short notes about language design, measurements, shipped boundaries, and what still remains unqualified.

15 October 2026 · Embench IoT

Embench IoT: Kotoba/Amu at 0.7999× C time in one M4 cycle

A single-cycle exploratory result across 19 translated Embench ports, with the kernel audit and separate comparisons against Rust, C, Zig, Go, and Swift.

Read the result and audit · 日本語

15 October 2026 · How to use

kotoba and murakumo on one bench: how to use each

A quick-use guide to the kotoba CLI, a murakumo node, kotobase, the commit chain, the checkpoint anchor, AWAI DNA and Base/x402 settlement, with an interactive figure of the 2026-10-06 fleet run.

Read the usage guide · 日本語の使い方 · Interactive figure

12 October 2026 · Native performance

Kotoba native performance: Embench progress, updated 13 October 2026

Latest main Round 85: Kotoba takes 2.954× C execution time across all 19 workloads. The C-or-faster goal is unmet; optimization is paused and unadopted candidates are preserved.

Read the progress report · 日本語の進捗報告

10 September 2026 · Infrastructure

Can Kotoba cut infra cost? One measured path, no invented savings

Build wait, CPU wall time, artifact bytes, and JVM-free emit can touch infra cost. This post ships mechanisms and named numbers only. No $/month claim, no language Release URL, no Kotoba-beats-Rust-or-C on GPU.

Read the measured path

Security engineering

Can Kotoba support a NIST CSF 2.0 program?

An evidence-led guide to capability boundaries, attack paths and the operating controls still needed around Kotoba.

Read the assessment and attack scenarios

Specification · Authentication

Organization identity and verifiable membership on Kotoba Cloud

Spec: organizations are did:webvh DIDs; membership is a W3C Verifiable Credential with status; runtime capability is Biscuit; a first-party trust registry anchors verification.

Read the specification

31 August 2026 · Benchmarks

A fifth benchmark, and the claim it would not support

The four benchmarks all built a program small enough to fit on one screen, which measures how quickly a toolchain starts rather than the number a developer waits on. The new build-scaling suite generates the same program at eight sizes, builds it through every toolchain on the host, and then executes what each one produced.

Executing the artifact is what makes it a benchmark rather than a stopwatch. The released Kotoba CLI emits an invalid WebAssembly module above 128 functions and exits successfully, so an unvalidated harness would have recorded its best numbers exactly where it had stopped working. Two further Kotoba lanes stop at declared bounds — a call-fuel budget and a function-count admission limit — which are the opposite result and had to be reported as such.

The suite was added to show build speed as a strength. It shows the released binary with the lowest cold-start build cost of any lane measured, and it shows that at large sizes build speed is not currently a Kotoba strength. Both halves are in the same table.

Read the build-scaling results

29 August 2026 · Benchmarks

Four benchmarks answer four different questions

Compiler startup measures one tiny source-to-artifact path. The developer-loop suite separates resolution, checking, clean and no-change builds, and first result across eleven toolchain paths. Native runtime measures already-built programs. A fourth suite compares strings, collections, allocation, I/O, concurrency, and a small real application across six representative runtime paths. Kotoba publishes them separately so one fast phase cannot be mistaken for universal speed.

Every emitted result is checked, but all speed rankings remain withheld because the recorded host-load gates failed.

Read the benchmark and inspect its evidence

28 August 2026 · Language design

No ambient authority is a language boundary

Kotoba programs do not begin with implicit filesystem, network, process, clock, model, or secret access. Source declares effects, admission intersects grants and policy, and the host binds only the resulting capabilities.

That design complements operating-system isolation; it does not replace the compiler, verifier, runtime, provider, key custody, or host policy in the trusted computing base.

See the computation boundary